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The Economist

WHEN Egyptian politicians discussed sabotaging the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in 2013, they naturally assumed it was a private meeting. But amid all the scheming, and with a big chuckle, Muhammad Morsi, then president, informed his colleagues that their discussion was being broadcast live on a state-owned television channel.

Embarrassment apart, it was already no secret that Egypt wanted to stop the largest hydroelectric project in Africa. When Ethiopia completes construction of the dam in 2017, it will stand 170 metres tall (550 feet) and 1.8km (1.1 miles) wide. Its reservoir will be able to hold more than the volume of the entire Blue Nile, the tributary on which it sits (see map). And it will produce 6,000 megawatts of electricity, more than double Ethiopia’s current measly output, which leaves three out of four people in the dark...

EXCERPTS:

. . . A sense of mistrust hangs over the dam’s ultimate use. Ethiopia insists that it will produce only power and that the water pushing its turbines (less some evaporation during storage) will ultimately come out the other side. But Egypt fears it will also be used for irrigation, cutting downstream supply. Experts are sceptical. “It makes no technological or economic sense [for Ethiopia] to irrigate land with that water,” as it would involve pumping it back upstream, says Kenneth Strzepek of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. . .

. . . How much water Sudan uses in the future, and other variables such as changes in rainfall and water quality, should determine how the dam is operated. That will require more co-operation and a willingness to compromise. Disagreement between Egypt and Sudan over such things as the definition of “significant harm” bodes ill. But all three countries will benefit if they work together, claims Mr Strzepek, citing the dam’s capacity to store water for use in drought years and its potential to produce cheap energy for export once transmission lines are built. . .

Read the article in The Economist.

Photo: Landsat-7 satellite image of the bend in the Nile River and adjacent farmland (Photo courtesy of Jesse Allen, NASA)

Benefits from international regulations may double those of domestic policy

Valerie Karplus and Michael Davidson | MIT Joint Program

After two weeks of negotiations, the Paris climate talks that ended on December 12 delivered the foundations of a post-2020 climate regime.

To advance climate change mitigation efforts, the new agreement incorporates national targets for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for 2025/2030, a new five-year cycle to establish subsequent targets, a reporting and review placeholder, and official stocktaking two years prior to those submissions to compare global progress against long-term goals.

In Paris, 189 of 195 participating countries pledged action in the form of intended nationally determined contributions, or INDCs. These pledges will be assessed in 2018 to encourage countries, where possible, to increase the level of ambition.

The review mechanism agreed on in Paris is a crucial first step. The new climate regime has also been lauded for its transparency provisions, which will be essential to establishing trust in the review process.

Implementing the pledge review process laid out in Paris will not be easy, but it is necessary to have a chance of ratcheting up efforts over time to meet the agreement’s ultimate goal of limiting global temperature rise to well below 2 degrees Celsius.

It is here that research universities and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) will have an important role to play.

A transparent review process

A functioning review process will require open and collaborative participation of signatory countries but should not rely solely on an expanded global bureaucracy. The vast majority of third-party analysis on countries’ energy and climate policies comes from academic and nongovernmental organizations, which should be strengthened following Paris.

Official reporting and review processes have existed since the framework convention in 1992. Over time, they have evolved to include periodic communications and highly structured reviews – differentiated by developing and developed countries – performed by a small set of accredited UN experts and other countries themselves. Paris strengthened these requirements by requiring, among other items, all major economies to submit biennial reports and a unified review of all countries' submissions.

Many parts of the current agreement are placeholders for detailed provisions to be decided over the coming years. We argue that in the new architecture of bottom-up pledges, the international community has an increased responsibility to assess levels of effort and abilities to scale up successful approaches.

Because of the complexity of nations' institutions, these mechanisms should be designed to enhance both the quality and impact of research outside formal UN processes. In particular, to both assess and support country pledges with an aim to accelerating global emissions reductions, we need significantly more transparency on pledges and policies and a flexible review process that can respond to concerns from academia.

Measurable and model-able pledges allow research communities to arrive separately at their own assessments of countries’ relative levels of effort and progress toward national commitments.

For example, using a countrywide energy-economic model of China, our collaborative team of researchers from Tsinghua University and MIT estimated annual reductions of over four Gigatons CO2 per year in 2030 in a scenario consistent with that country’s Paris pledge compared to a no-policy case. This reduction would equal approximately three times Japan’s CO2 emissions in 2014. More importantly, this work helped policymakers in and outside of China understand how policies then under consideration could help the country reach peak CO2 emissions in 2030, with the help of a CO2 price.

Many other groups arrived independently at estimates of available CO2 emissions reductions from the Chinese economy. It is exercises like these that offer transparency, credibility and – perhaps most importantly – an opportunity to probe and enhance a shared understanding of the implications of national commitments that remain at arm’s length from the political arena.

Beyond pledges

Assessments of pledge progress reports would naturally be more convincing if accompanied by a suite of policy actions and planned changes in existing institutions and processes to facilitate implementation.

To reinforce pledges, countries are called on in the agreement to submit “information necessary to track progress.” More concretely, they should be asked to compile a list of implementing directives, challenges faced and proposed pathways, given that most governments are establishing domestic policies prior to announcing them on the global stage in future climate talks.

For instance, the US’ Clean Power Plan, a crucial policy in the absence of nationwide climate legislation, will face significant court challenges.

Reporting requirements should explicitly recognize these domestic policy constraints, allowing the scientific and modeling community to consider their implications and investigate, as needed, alternative policy pathways.

Data challenges

A transparent, arm’s-length review process will also help to generate internationally credible assessments of GHG abatement efforts in developing countries, where accounting challenges are significant.

As a case in point, China, which targets a 60%-65% reduction in its CO2 intensity in 2030, relative to 2005 levels, is well known for its challenges in reporting accurate data. The country recently revised upward how much coal it has been burning every year by as much as 17%.

Indeed, data revisions will occur, particularly in developing countries that are in the process of establishing data collection systems.

The biennial reporting requirement agreed to in Paris can provide a regular avenue to incorporate revisions. The research community can also help by incorporating revisions into models and assessing implications for meeting emissions goals.

Negotiators further agreed that national commitments should be communicated to “facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding.” This should extend to the range of assumptions and calculation methodologies.

For example, conventions for calculating the nonfossil share of primary energy differs among countries and agencies. China uses the coal-equivalent method, which equates electricity use to the coal use it displaces, while the International Energy Agency employs the direct-equivalent method, which yields smaller percentages for a given level of deployment.

Another benefit of engaging research communities is scaled-up technical analysis and support, while added redundancy allows for multiple independent assessments of progress. These assessments can help identify and laud when countries exceed their goals, encourage upward revisions by expanding successful programs, identify reasons for slow progress and inform technological and policy solutions.

Peer-reviewed pledges

Transparency is critical, and redundancy will further limit – although not entirely avoid – any efforts to undermine the integrity of the process.

Building on previous pledging systems, an important change in Paris was to create a common technical expert review, composed of a limited number of accredited experts with special training. These experts could play an important role in knowledge assessment and synthesis of the country analysis outside experts deliver. In addition, the review should be constructed to allow for official clarification of methodologies such as those raised above.

Stocktaking processes will also be decided over the coming years, and galvanizing a wide range of civil society researchers will likewise be critical to success. The range of emissions gap reports in advance of Paris, a case in point, illuminated important assumptions for future trends such as expected levels of future efforts, or ratcheting.

The requirement to take stock every five years has the potential to become a focal point for wide-ranging studies on long-term goals.

Engaging the broader community

The Paris agreement institutionalizes a periodic review of pledges such that countries are expected to come back both with increased commitments and progress reports. This process will be absolutely critical if we are to come close to achieving the most ambitious climate change mitigation goals embodied in the Paris agreement.

Engaging the broader research community in the review process is our best hope for generating credible estimates of how we are doing as a planet. A critical part of this will be equipping researchers in developing countries to participate as equal partners in this assessment effort.

Up to now, pledges have been the key measure of a climate regime’s success. But only if it devotes just as much ambition to review as it does to pledges can the new global climate regime truly deliver.

Authors

Valerie J Karplus, Assistant Professor of Global Economics and Management, MIT Sloan School of Management

Michael Davidson, PhD Candidate in engineering systems , Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The Conversation is a collaboration between editors and academics to provide informed news analysis and commentary that’s free to read and republish.

Photo: Valerie Karplus takes questions at a panel discussion held by the MIT Club of Paris during the COP21 talks. (Source: Emily Dahl/MIT Energy Initiative)

MIT events throughout climate talks underscore Institute's global perspectives and partnerships

Posted by Michael Davidson and Valerie Karplus on Dec 11, 2015

From the Paris Climate Negotiations

National goal-setting—an expected key outcome from the Paris climate talks currently underway—is a common fixture of policy-making in China and many other countries. Collectively, the current pledges still show significant gaps toward meeting long-term climate goals. Nevertheless, they represent an important increase in scope and ambition over those pledged in advance of the 2009 Copenhagen summit, and those established earlier under the Kyoto Protocol. There is great importance in—and a growing consensus around—enhancing these previous rounds of commitments through a pledge-and-review institution, which if designed properly can also mobilize domestic constituencies even across a wide range of political systems. As China and other countries begin to consider their next steps, we explain here the interaction of international and domestic policy-making in setting climate action targets in China.

China’s Increasingly Stringent International Commitments

China in particular stands out for its evolution over this period as it has taken on increasingly stringent international commitments in tandem with massive climate and energy programs at home. Looking at its domestic constituencies—including extremely powerful fossil fuel and local government interests that are net losers under a carbon control program without compensation—this transition over the span of less than a decade is striking.

Economic advantages as a major clean energy equipment exporter, international pressure as China transitioned to the world’s largest emitter, and pervasive concerns over air pollution have helped persuade central policymakers. In turn, we find that central figures have created and used international pledges (outer – Wai) as a lever to push for and prioritize domestic action (inner – Nei). To understand how this works, we describe how underneath China’s unitary central government lies a complex policy-making hierarchy, which reinforces actions and realigns interest groups to further a transition toward low-carbon energy sources.

Climate Targets in Three Flavors

China’s energy-related climate targets come in three flavors: 1) intensity-based targets with respect to economic growth; 2) shares of energy supply, i.e., minimum non-fossil proportion of primary energy; and, most recently, 3) a CO2 peaking year (though not peaking amount). A sudden increase in energy-intensive production over 2002-2005 created concerns of energy insecurity and led to the establishment of the first flavor, energy intensity “binding targets” (约束性目标) in the 11th Five-Year-Plan (2006-2010). A medium-term target of the second flavor, to achieve a non-fossil energy share in primary energy¹ of 15% by 2020, was established in a 2007 energy strategy document together with a range of other expansion goals meant more as guidelines than targets. At that point in time, there was no discussion of peaking emissions on the horizon.

In studies of China’s governance system—especially the target-setting process—it is well-known that more targets are given than are expected to be followed. Thus, prioritizing central directives is a crucial exercise for provincial governments, the typical implementing institutions (state-owned enterprises are the other). These decisions are made based on different assessments of importance, but binding targets established in five-year-plans as well as internationalized commitments are given high weight.

In 2010, on the heels of the Copenhagen climate talks, it was announced that several provinces were behind schedule in reducing energy intensity. Premier Wen Jiabao, who had delivered China’s international climate commitment, became the central domestic figure rounding up the laggards. China’s pledge in preparation for those talks also raised the non-fossil energy target out of obscurity and enshrined a CO2 intensity objective, which joined energy as a binding target in the 12th Five-Year-Plan released two years later.

Over the next five years, China’s central agencies set forth a number of climate and energy policies, ranging from traditional mandatory approaches such as scaled-up industrial energy efficiency mandates to newer economic incentives such as standardized electricity tariffs for all renewable energies and carbon cap-and-trade pilots. These had the support of the important National Leading Group on Climate Change, Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction, which in turn has cited responsibility to meet internationalized commitments.

Inside China’s Policymaking

A simplified sketch of the importance of highly publicized goals, using the recent round of electricity reform as an example, is instructive. In 2013, central party leaders set guiding principles on a new round of market reforms through small leading groups—which have a long history of directing central policy—chaired by President Xi Jinping, and last year set timetables for specific reforms. Language—e.g., related to the role of the market—was translated into a high-level State Council energy strategy document in 2014 and ultimately a blueprint for electricity sector reorganization released this year. Finally, agencies such as the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA) have visited localities to emphasize the importance of the specific reform measures, and have established policy and implementing measures (e.g., to improve renewable energy utilization). At each step, the crucial link with central goals was preserved, ensuring that the drafting—typically not done by State Council staff—helped unambiguously establish priorities.

International and Domestic Policy Reinforcing Each Other

China’s Paris commitment expands this process by incorporating the three flavors of targets and helping shape future domestic actions. To increase non-fossil energy share, China promised to implement “green power dispatch” in a joint US-China announcement made prior to this year’s UN talks. And a CO2 peaking year of no later than 2030 will provide much-needed urgency to establishing rules and accountability for the upcoming national cap-and-trade system.

This policy process has clear implications for the importance of a robust pledge-and-review institution. China’s commitments—including a US$3.1 bn climate fund for developing countries—helped build momentum for Paris. The UN process can also help ratchet up and improve implementation of commitments by ensuring there are frequent reviews of existing pledges and continued opportunities for new ones. This will not only prompt central leaders to make bolder commitments but also provide ammunition for those seeking further domestic reforms to achieve them.

^1.Importantly, China’s calculation of primary energy deviates from international conventions. See Lewis et al 2015.

Michael Davidson is a PhD candidate in engineering systems at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and a research assistant in the Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change. Dr. Valerie Karplus, a ChinaFAQs expert, is an Assistant Professor in the Global Economics and Management Group at the MIT Sloan School of Management, and a Faculty Affiliate of the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change.

ChinaFAQs is a project facilitated by the World Resources Institute that provides insight into critical questions about Chinese policy and action on energy and climate change. The ChinaFAQs network is comprised of U.S.-based experts, including researchers at U.S. universities and government laboratories, independent scholars, and other professionals. 

Photo: China and U.S. pavilions at COP21. The U.S. and China announced their international commitments together in advance of the Paris talks. (Photo by Michael Davidson)