News and Outreach: Kenneth Strzepek

The policy community has long prophesied about the coming water wars. But don't expect them anytime soon. More likely, tensions over access will merely exacerbate existing regional conflicts.

By: Shlomi Dinar, Lucia De Stefano, James Duncan, Kerstin Stahl, Kenneth M. Strzepek, Aaron T. Wolf

Right: Looking south over the Mediterranean and down the Nile, from the International Space Station. (NASA / flickr)


The world economic downturn and upheaval in the Arab world might grab headlines, but another big problem looms: environmental change. Along with extreme weather patterns, rising sea levels, and other natural hazards, global warming disrupts freshwater resource availability -- with immense social and political implications. Earlier this year, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence published a report, Global Water Security, assessing hydropolitics around the world. In it, the authors show that international water disputes will affect not only the security interests of riparian states, but also of the United States. 

In many parts of the world, freshwater is already a scarce resource. It constitutes only 2.5 percent of all available water on the planet. And only about .4 percent of that is easily accessible for human consumption. Of that tiny amount, a decreasing share is potable because of pollution and agricultural and industrial water use. All that would be bad enough, but many freshwater bodies are shared among two or more riparian states, complicating their management.

Of course, the policy community has long prophesied impending "water wars." In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon warned that "water scarcity ... is a potent fuel for wars and conflict." Yet history has not witnessed many. In fact, the only official war over water took place about 4,500 years ago. It was a conflict between the city-states of Lagash and Umma in modern day Iraq over the Tigris river. More recently, there have been some close calls, especially in the arid Middle East. About two years before the 1967 War, Israel and Syria exchanged fire over the Jordan River Basin, which both said the other was overusing. The limited armed clashes petered out, but the political dispute over the countries' shared water sources continues. In 2002, Lebanon constructed water pumps on one of the river's tributaries, which caused concern for downstream Israel. The project never provoked any formal military action, but with peace in the region already precarious, verbal exchanges between the two countries prompted the United States to step in. Both parties eventually accepted a compromise that would allow Lebanon to withdraw a predetermined amount of water for its domestic needs.

In short, predictions of a Water World War are overwrought. However, tensions over water usage can still exacerbate other existing regional conflicts. Climate change is expected to intensify droughts, floods, and other extreme weather conditions that jeopardize freshwater quantity and quality and therefore act as a threat-multiplier, making shaky regions shakier.

So what river basins constitute the biggest risks today? In a World Bank report we published in 2010 (as well as a subsequent article in a special issue of the Journal of Peace Research) we analyzed the physical effects of climate change on international rivers. We modeled the variability in river annual runoff in the past and for future climate scenarios. We also considered the existence and nature of the institutional capacity around river basins, in the form of international water treaties, to potentially deal with the effects of climate change.

According to our research, 24 of the world's 276 international river basins are already experiencing increased water variability. These 24 basins, which collectively serve about 332 million people, are at high risk of water related political tensions. The majority of the basins are located in northern and sub-Saharan Africa. A few others are located in the Middle East, south-central Asia, and South America. They include the Tafna (Algeria and Morocco), the Dasht (Iran and Pakistan), the Congo (Central Africa), Lake Chad (Central Africa), the Niger (Western Africa), the Nile (Northeastern Africa), and the Chira (Ecuador and Peru). There are no strong treaties governing the use of these water reserves in tense territories. Should conflicts break out, there are no good mechanisms in place for dealing with them.

By 2050, an additional 37 river basins, serving 83 million people, will be at high risk for feeding into political tensions. As is the case currently, a large portion of these are in Africa. But, unlike today, river basins within Central Asia, Eastern Europe, Central Europe, and Central America will also be at high risk within 40 years. Some of these include the Kura-Araks (Iran, Turkey, and the Caucasus), the Neman (Eastern Europe) Asi-Orontes (Lebanon, Syria, Turkey), and the Catatumbo Basins (Colombia and Venezuela).

CROSSING THE NILE

Among the larger African basins, the Nile has the greatest implications for regional and global security. Tensions over access to the river already pit Ethiopia and Egypt, two important Western allies, against one another. Egypt has been a major player in the Middle East Peace Process and Ethiopia is an important regional force in the Horn of Africa, currently aiding other African forces to battle Al-Shabbab in Somalia.

Over the years, a number of international water treaties have made rules for the basin, but they are largely limited to small stretches of it. In particular, only Egypt and Sudan are party to the 1959 Nile River Agreement, the principal treaty regarding the river. Egypt, which is the furthest downstream yet is one of the most powerful countries in the region, has been able to heavily influence the water-sharing regime. Upstream countries, such as Ethiopia and Burundi, have been left out, hard-pressed to harness the Nile for their own needs.

In 1999, with increasingly vitriolic rhetoric between Egypt and Ethiopia sidetracking regional development, the World Bank stepped up its involvement in the basin. It helped create a network of professional water managers as well as a set of investments in a number of sub-basins. Still, the drafting of a new agreement stalled: upstream countries would not compromise on their right to develop water infrastructure while downstream countries would not compromise on protecting their shares. In 2010, Ethiopia signed an agreement with a number of the other upstream countries hoping to balance against Egypt and Sudan. More recently, the country has also announced plans to construct a number of large upstream dams, which could affect the stability of the region.

By 2050, the environmental state of the Nile Basin will be even worse. That is why it is important to create a robust and equitable water treaty now. Such a treaty would focus on ways to harness the river's hydropower potential to satiate the energy needs of all the riparian states while maintaining ecosystem health. The construction of dams and reservoirs further upstream could likewise help even out water flows and facilitate agricultural growth. Projects such as these, mitigating damage to ecosystem health and local populations, would benefit all parties concerned and thus facilitate further basin-wide cooperation.

UP IN THE ARAL

Another water basin of concern is the Aral Sea, which is shared by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The basin consists of two major rivers, the Syr Darya and Amu Darya. During the Soviet era, these two rivers were managed relatively effectively. The break-up of the Soviet Union, however, ended that. The major dispute now is between upstream Kyrgyzstan and downstream Uzbekistan over the Syr Darya. During the winter, Kyrgyzstan needs flowing water to produce hydroelectricity whereas Uzbekistan needs to store water to later irrigate cotton fields.

The countries have made several attempts to resolve the dispute. In particular, downstream Uzbekistan, which is rich in fuel and gas, has provided energy to Kyrgyzstan to compensate for keeping water in its large reservoirs until the cotton-growing season. Such barter agreements, however, have had limited success because they are easily manipulated. Downstream states might deliver less fuel during a rainy year, claiming they need less water from upstream reservoirs, and upstream states might deliver less water in retaliation. Kyrgyzstan, frustrated and desperate for energy in winter months, plans to build mega hydro-electric plants in its territory. And another upstream state, Tajikistan, is likewise considering hydro-electricity to satiate its own energy needs. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan is building large reservoirs.

Although these plans might make sense in the very near term, they are inefficient in the medium and long term because they don't solve the real needs of downstream states for large storage capacity to protect against water variability across time. In fact, both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, along with Kazakhstan, will see substantial increases in water variability between now and 2050. And so, the need to share the benefits of existing large-capacity upstream reservoirs and coordinate water uses through strong and more efficient inter-state agreements is unavoidable.

A stabilized Aral Sea basin would also benefit the United States. With its withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington has been courting Uzbekistan as a potential alternative ally and provider of stability in the region. The Uzbek government seems willing to host U.S. military bases and work as a counter-weight to Russia. Kyrgyzstan is also an important regional player. The Manas Air Base, the U.S. military installation near Bishkek, is an important transit point. The country is also working with the United States to battle drug trafficking and infiltration of criminal and insurgent groups. Regional instability could disrupt any of these strategic relationships.

If the past is any indication, the world probably does not need to worry about impending water wars. But they must recognize how tensions over water can easily fuel larger conflicts and distract states from other important geopolitical and domestic priorities. Since formal inter-state institutions are key to alleviating tensions over shared resources, it would be wise, then, for the involved governments as well as the international community to negotiate sufficiently robust agreements to deal with impending environmental change. Otherwise, freshwater will only further frustrate stability efforts in the world's volatile regions.

SHLOMI DINAR is associate professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations and associate director of the School of International and Public Affairs at Florida International University. LUCIA DE STEFANO is associate professor at Complutense University of Madrid and researcher at the Water Observatory of the Botín Foundation. JAMES DUNCAN is consultant on natural resource governance and geography with the World Bank. KERSTIN STAHL is senior scientist at the Institute of Hydrology in the University of Freiburg. KENNETH M. STRZEPEK is research scientist with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change. AARON T. WOLF is a professor of geography in the College of Earth, Ocean, and Atmospheric Sciences at Oregon State University.

Read more from the Mozambique News Agency.


MIT and U.N. researchers team up to tackle some of the heftiest climate change challenges developing countries will face as they confront an uncertain future.

Higher temperatures, extreme flooding, longer droughts — for those living in the developed world, the symptoms of climate change mean building higher bridges and paying more for a bowl of cereal. But for those in low-income countries trying to grow and develop, climate change is yet another roadblock.

"In developing countries — and particularly in Africa — they're building their infrastructure at a very fast rate. They're also the most vulnerable to climate change impacts like flooding," says Ken Strzepek, a researcher with MIT's Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, who has joined forces with the United Nations University-World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) to help policymakers use a holistic approach to their development strategies.

He and his MIT colleague Adam Schlosser traveled to Finland to present their research at a UNU-WIDER conference last week. The conference was an opportunity to share the results of a multi-study analysis sponsored by UNU-WIDER and released in August as a special edition version of the journal Review of Development Economics. Strzepek was a co-editor.

In their research, Strzepek and colleagues from the Universities of Copenhagen and Colorado take temperature and precipitation projections and look at how flooding, droughts and other impacts of climate change could shape factors such as crop yields, roads and energy infrastructure — all critical for a nation's growth. In doing so, they help governments in these low-income countries decide "Do we adapt now to an uncertain future? Or do we wait and potentially pay more later?" Strzepek says.

Knowing what is unknown

The researchers' main conclusion from their work is that there is so much overall uncertainty surrounding the impacts of climate change that how a country should respond depends largely on very specific factors.

Strzepek gave Tanzania as one example from his research. Like most living in developing nations, the people of Tanzania rely heavily on rain-fed agriculture. Because of the potential for increases in floods and droughts, climate change is seen as a major threat to their main source of food and income. But Strzepek found there was a very large variability in how and how much these changes could affect the country.

"You can't just go to the prime minister and say agriculture is going to go down 20 percent," says Strzepek, "there's too much uncertainty."

But there is very little uncertainty when Strzepek looked at Mozambique. There, it was clear that flooding and sea level rise would be two critical threats to the economy, and in particular to roads needed to transport food from rural farms to city populations.

"So it would make sense for the government to spend the money now to build the roads in a way that makes them less vulnerable in the future," Strzepek says.

As a third example, he studied the development of hydropower in Ethiopia, which they plan to use as an electricity export to help fund roads, schools and other social investments. In studying future impacts to hydropower, Strzepek finds that by 2050 climate change could both positively and negatively affect the energy source. But in the short term, he recommends that the government continue their plan.

"Climate change won't affect the plans that are under way now," Strzepek says. "In 15 years, we'll know a lot more about the direction of climate change and we'll be able to adapt at that time."

Strzepek found too much uncertainty to act in Tanzania, too much not to act in Ethiopia, and very little uncertainty in Mozambique. While the case studies are a needed first step at shedding light on the harsh realities of developing under climate change, much is still unclear.

With the current approach, "you can only look at the extremes," Strzepek says. "Policymakers don't like extremes or worst case scenarios because they can't afford to plan for the worst case scenarios. They like to see what is the likelihood of different outcomes."

That is the next phase of the research. Strzepek and Schlosser are beginning to use the MIT Integrated Global System Modeling (IGSM) framework, which, on a global scale, quantifies the likelihood of various climate predictions and compares them with different policies. They are now bringing this technique down to a regional scale.

Schlosser previewed this approach at the UNU-WIDER conference, while Strzepek gave an example of how it could be used.